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Abstract
This short contribution aims at identifying certain provisions of the Agreement that might be
considered for amendment, in light of the general principles that, in our view, should inspire the
reform of the ADA. Part I below deals with such general principles; Part II sets out suggestions
concerning the determination of the product scope in an anti-dumping investigation; Part III deals
with Article 5 of the ADA (initiation of the investigation); Part IV is concerned with amendments
to Article 2 ADA (dumping); Part V deals with Article 3 ADA (injury); Part VI concerns the
reform of Article 11 ADA (reviews and refunds); Part VII concerns introduction of rules on anticircumvention; Part VIII deals with amendments regarding special and differential treatment for
developing country Members; finally, in Part IX we draw some conclusions on the proposed issues
of reform.

THE FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE
REFORM OF THE ANTI-DUMPING
AGREEMENT: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE*
Konstantinos Adamantopoulos** & Diego De Notaris***
INTRODUCTION
In December 1999, about one year ago, at the Seattle World
Trade Organization' ("WTO") Ministerial Conference, the
United States firmly opposed WTO negotiations that would reopen discussions in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations to amend the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement Tariffs and Trade 19942
("Agreement" or "ADA"). Over the months of preparation to
Seattle, the EC developed a more flexible approach, showing
availability to consider issues on the reform of the Agreement
and reserving its final position on whether to support amendments during the negotiations. The United States was isolated
in its intransigence.
Commentators attributed the rigidity of the U.S. Administration at Seattle-at least in public-to a series of contingent
needs (e.g., gaining support of U.S. steel workers for the forthcoming Presidential elections, trying to increase consensus
among those industry sectors that are traditional users of antidumping measures for the launch of the Millennium Round,
etc.).
Whether these tactical reasons had a significant influence
* The authors wish to thank Professor David O'Keeffe for his comments on an

earlier draft of this contribution. The opinions expressed in this Essay, as well as any
mistakes, are the sole responsibility of the authors. We also would like to thank
Charlotte Mellor for her help in compiling the footnotes.
** Partner and Head of the European Law Unit, Hammond Suddards Edge, Brussels.

*** Associate, Hammond Suddards Edge, European Law Unit, Brussels. I wish to
thank Gary N. Horlick for sharing with me his impressions on the outcome of the Seattle Ministerial Conference.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter

WTO Agreement).
2. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-dumping), Apr. 15, 1994 WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final_e.htm [hereinafter ADA].

REFORM OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

on the U.S. position, or whether other more strategic motivations-targeting tariff liberalization, while reserving the possibility to increase tariffs to levels well beyond the bound rate in special circumstances-were instead determinant, is still subject to
argument and discussion.
It appears, however, crucial for the Bush administration to
regain a central and propulsive role in re-launching multilateral
trade negotiations for the New Round in view of the forthcoming WTO Ministerial Conference that will take place in late
2001. Anti-dumping will certainly be one of the areas in which
the negotiating leadership of the United States will be tested in
the coming months.
The position of the EC in this respect has undergone various degrees of openness to reform of the Agreement. The EC
has sought to strike a difficult balance between fragile support
from its Member States and the strategic need to give some concessions (or at least show some flexibility) to developing countries, in an attempt to reduce their opposition to the EC Common Agriculture Policy and to increase their support for EC demands on services in the framework of multilateral trade
negotiations.
The EC, or at least the European Commission, is now prepared to engage in talks on the review of the Agreement, in an
effort to polarize the support of the developing WTO Members
and of the traditional targets of anti-dumping measures around
its own negotiating positions on other sectors/WTO agreements.
It appears, however, that the EC still considers the review of the
Agreement as a trade-off item in the context of the negotiations
for a New Round, and therefore, at this stage, it is fairly difficult
to predict which specific reforms the EC will agree upon, without considering an eventual review of the Agreement in the
framework of wider negotiations in a New Round.
Considering the mounting pressure from the majority of developing countries and from WTO Members traditionally
targeted by anti-dumping investigations, and taking into account
that at least some of the contingent reasons for the rigidity of the
U.S. position at Seattle have now disappeared, it would appear
that the 2001 Ministerial Conference might give new vigor to a
perspective reform of the Agreement, also in the light of recent

32

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:30

WTO dispute settlement proceedings concerning anti-dumping
investigations.
This short contribution aims at identifying certain provisions of the Agreement that might be considered for amendment, in light of the general principles that, in our view, should
inspire the reform of the ADA. Part I below deals with such general principles; Part II sets out suggestions concerning the determination of the product scope in an anti-dumping investigation;
Part III deals with Article 5 of the ADA (initiation of the investigation); Part IV is concerned with amendments to Article 2 ADA
(dumping); Part V deals with Article 3 ADA (injury); Part VI concerns the reform of Article 11 ADA (reviews and refunds); Part
VII concerns introduction of rules on anti-circumvention; Part
VIII deals with amendments regarding special and differential
treatment for developing country Members; finally, in Part IX we
draw some conclusions on the proposed issues of reform.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT
A. Neutrality Vis-d-Vis Dumping Practices-Restrictionof
Anti-dumping
Dumping is currently defined by the Agreement as a practice consisting, essentially, of exporting, or selling for export, a
product at a price lower than the price normally charged on the
exporter/manufacturer's home market. Opinions may differ as
to whether or not this practice, per se, constitutes unfair price
competition. It is, however, a fact that an increasing number of
WTO Members' have anti-dumping legislation in place, and use
it to take action against dumping in order to defend domestic
industries.
It is important to stress that the Agreement does not qualify
dumping as an unfair trade practice per se. The Agreement does
not discipline dumping, but rather anti-dumping (i.e., WTO
Members' reactions to dumping).4 This is in contrast to U.S.
legislation, still referring to dumping as unfair price practice, 5
3. And non-Members (e.g., the People's Republic of China).
4. Article 1 of the ADA provides that "[a]n anti-dumping measure shall be applied
only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to
investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement."
5. Tariff Act of 1930, Title VII, §701-783 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §1671-1677 2000).
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and to EC practice, often referring to dumping as unfair trade
practice in the Regulations of the European Commission imposing provisional anti-dumping duties6 and in the Regulations of
the Council of the EU imposing definitive duties.'
We believe it is important to stress the neutrality of the
Agreement with respect to dumping practices, and that the
Agreement is an instrument to restrain the use of anti-dumping.
Anti-dumping practices cause WTO Members to deviate from
the general principles of tariff binding/predictability8 and nondiscrimination (i.e., MFN, GATT Article I),9 and should therefore be restrained, according to Article VI of GATT 1994, and
the Agreement implementing it. Applying the principle of restriction of anti-dumping practices to the interpretation of the
Agreement, we believe that, because the Agreement permits
practices contrary to the general principles of the trading system, the Agreement should therefore be interpreted in a restrictive way. Specifically, in the presence of more than one possible
interpretation, the interpretation most restrictive of the use of
anti-dumping should prevail." °
6. E.g., Commission Regulation No. 2720/93, O.J. L 246/12 (1993) (imposing a
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation).
7. E.g., Council Regulation No. 1522/00, O.J. L 175/10, at 10-28 (2000) (imposing
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic staple fibers of polyester originating in Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand and collecting definitively the provisional
duty imposed).
8. See Trading, into the Future-The Introduction to the WTO, at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tiLe/fact2-e.htm. The website states that:
Sometimes, promising not to raise a trade barrier can be as important as lowering one, because the promise gives businesses a clearer view of their future
opportunities. With stability and predictability, investment is encouraged,jobs
are created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits of competitionchoice and lower prices. The multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the business environment stable and predictable.
Id. In this sense we refer to the principle of tariff binding as a way to enhance predictability in the trading system.
9. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUNDS vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 1154 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
10. We note, however, that the current standard of review for anti-dumping measures provided for in Article 17 of the Agreement is drafted to allow many permissive
interpretations of the use of anti-dumping by the administering authorities. See ADA
art. 17(6) (stating that "where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those
permissible interpretations").
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B. PromotingFair Competition
While the Agreement does not qualify dumping as unfair
trade practice per se, it does provide for rules restricting the use
of anti-dumping. Such restrictive rules should be designed to
enhance competition, or at least not to hinder fair competition,
between domestic and imported goods.1 1
In fact, as dumping practices are not necessarily anti-competitive, it follows that the use of anti-dumping should not be
allowed to counter dumping practices that do not affect fair
competition.
The tension between competition and trade policy can be
described as a conflict between two ideologically similar concepts with differing views as to the means of achieving the same
goal. The enforcement of competition law in trade cases is "of
particular importance since it limits the risk that domestic producers may use the threat of initiating action under domestic
trade remedies law or otherwise lobbying protection in order to
induce foreign exporters to enter into unlawful restrictive agree12
ments."
Unfortunately, the principle of promoting fair competition
is not fully implemented in the Agreement, although it is contained, in nuce, in Article 3, as well as in other provisions of the
Agreement.
C. Certainty of the Law
As previously anticipated, predictability is implemented in
the world trading system through clear commitments (e.g., tariff
bindings) and clear and easy-to-interpret rules.
One of the problems with the current Agreement is that it is
too vague on many key issues, leaving leeway to the administering authorities to interpret it in an unduly protectionist manner.
We can look at this problem pragmatically and note that the present text of the Agreement is the result of a compromise between very different negotiating positions emerging during the
Uruguay Round, was put together at the last minute, and con11. See ADA art. 9(2) (providing that anti-dumping duty shall be imposed and/or
collected on a non-discriminatory basis, in the appropriate amount in each case, on
imports of the like product from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury).
12. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND
COMPETITION POLICIES FOR TOMORROW 17 (1999).
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tains many technical deficiencies.'" Alternatively, we can look at
the question from a theoretical viewpoint, noting that the uncertainty and vagueness of the Agreement finds its roots in the contradiction between the position that dumping, as defined by the
Agreement, should be sanctioned only when it is causing injury,
and the lack of qualification of dumping in positive or negative
terms, coupled with the unclear definition of what constitutes
injury (is it just a material damage to the domestic industry, or
an unfair damage?).
The practical result of the uncertainty of some provisions of
the present Agreement is that an exporter/producer is not really
able to determine in advance, upon the commencement of an
investigation, the level of the final duty that will be imposed on
its exports. Sometimes the exporter/producer is not even able
to determine whether or not he is dumping (according to the
dumping calculation practices of the different administering authorities).
This situation, in the absence of any reform aimed at improving the legal certainty of the provisions of the Agreement
(and, as a consequence, of anti-dumping laws of the WTO Members), is destined to worsen, as it is now increasingly clear that
enhanced trade liberalization brings along increased use of antidumping laws, in particular by developing countries.1 4
D. EncouragingDevelopment and Economic Reform
It is common opinion that the Agreement does not contain
sufficiently clear and effective provisions to protect the interests
of the developing country Members of the WTO. For example,
the Agreement does not take into consideration the heavy burden anti-dumping investigations have on developing countries,
irrespective of whether duties are imposed or not.
Non-market economy countries do not view the current
provisions as encouraging economic reform, but rather as punitive measures. Such measures are perceived as annulling substantial trade benefit derived from the bound tariff rates by withdrawing such concessions by means of high anti-dumping duties.
13. See generally Gary N. Horlick & Eleanor C. Shea, The World Trade Organization
Anti-dumping Agreement, 29J. OF WORLD TRADE 1, 5 (1995).
14. SeeJ. Miranda et al., The InternationalUse of Antidumping- 1987-1997, 32 J. OF
WORLD TRADE 5 (1998).
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This situation is due to the special rules on the calculation of
normal value for these countries.
Having briefly examined the general principles that we believe should inspire the reform of the Agreement, we will now
discuss possible ways in which such principles might be implemented in the amendments to the Agreement.
II. THE PRODUCT SCOPE OF ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION
The Agreement defines the term "like product" as a product
that is identical (i.e., alike in all respects to the product under
consideration), or in the absence of such a product, another
product that, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.
The notion of a "like product" has been subject to discussions since the signature of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in 1947. Since the definition of "like product" has
not been settled in the anti-dumping context, administering authorities enjoy much discretion in determining the product
scope of anti-dumping investigations.
This is evident in a comparison between EC and U.S. antidumping investigations concerning polyester staple fibers
("PSF"). While the Commission and Council consistently hold
that all PSF types are one "like product, ' 16 the Department of
Commerce initiated in 1999 an anti-dumping proceeding concerning PSF for non-woven end use, specifically excluding from
PSF use to make carpets and PSF
the scope of the investigation
17
uses for spinning end use.
It is difficult to imagine that differences in end uses or physical characteristics between U.S. and European PSF can justify
such a different treatment; moreover, it must be stressed that
15. See ADA art. 2.6
16. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 2904/91, O.J. L 276/7, at 13 (1991) (imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China, and Turkey); Council
Regulation No. 1728/99, o.J. L/204, at 3 (1999) (imposing a definitive anti-dumping
duty on imports of synthetic staple fibers of polyester originating in Belarus).
17. See Initiation of Anti-dumping Duty Investigations: Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From The Republic of Korea and Taiwan, 64 Fed. Reg. A-580-839, A-583-833 (Apr.
29, 1999).
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inconsistencies exist even in the practices of administering authorities considered in isolation.
For instance, in Footwear from China and Indonesia,1 8 the
EC held that a "two way" interchangeability test, based on physical characteristics, end use, and consumer perceptions, had to
be satisfied in order to consider slippers and outdoor shoes as
one product. The test was satisfied only in one direction (i.e.,
the Commission determined that slippers could be substituted
by outdoor shoes for indoor use). The test failed in the other
direction (i.e., the Commission could not determine that outdoor shoes could be replaced by slippers for outdoor use, due to
slippers' "usual flimsiness"). Applying the same reasoning to the
PSF 9 and Steel Wire Ropes20 proceedings, a "two way" interchangeability test would give a result that, even if some models
of a product with higher technical specifications can substitute
models of a product with lower technical specifications, the substitution of high performance ropes, or PSF for spinning, with
general purpose ropes, or PSF for non-woven end use, is prevented by differences in physical characteristics and by safety/
special performance considerations well perceivable by end
users. Even in the case where the substitution is technically possible (higher standard products substituting lower standard
products), it is still not commercially viable, at least in the two
examples given above, due to the large difference in prices between the products.
However, the EC held in the two cases mentioned above,
that high performance and general-purpose ropes were one
"like product," as well as spinning and non-woven PSF.
18. See Council Regulation No. 2155/97, Oj. L 298/1, at 8 (1997).
19. See Council Regulation No. 1522/00, imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty
on imports of synthetic staple fibers of polyester originating in Australia, Indonesia and
Thailand and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, in O.J. L 175/10, at
10-28 (2000). PSF for non-woven end use cannot be used for spinning purposes. PSF
for spinning presents higher technical specifications (higher tensile strength, etc.),
which allow it to be spun in modern, high speed spinning machines, while PSF for nonwoven end use cannot be spun.
20. See Council Regulation No.1796/99 (imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty,
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, on imports of steel ropes and
cables originating in the People's Republic of China, Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland,
South Africa, and Ukraine, in O.J. L 217/1, at 1-13 (1999)). General purpose ropes
(used for general applications, e.g., construction industry, slings, etc.) cannot substitute
high performance ropes (e.g., in human safety applications, ski lift, cranes etc.), while
some high performance ropes can substitute some types of general purpose ropes.
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In light of the principles set out in Part I, it is clear that such
levels of discretion in determining product scope do not offer
much legal certainty to operators. It is also clear that the determination of "like product," at least in the EC practice, does not
consistently obey a market-based approach (i.e., grouping prod21
ucts in direct competition with. each other).
As far as the EC practice is concerned, the Commission has
expressly recognized that the determination of "like" products in
an anti-dumping investigation can lend itself to different criteria,
giving more relative weight to, for example, physical characteristics, than in the determination of relevant product market in
merger control cases. In merger control cases, a more detailed
analysis is performed and special consideration is given to prod22
uct substitutability both on the supply and demand sides.
21. See Marco Bronkers & Natalie McWelis, Rethinking the "Like Product"Definition in
WOAnti-dumpingLaw, 33J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1999) (discussing the use of the marketbased approach in the "like" product definition in WTO anti-dumping law).
22. See Commission Decision No. 97/610/EEC, O.J. L 247/1 at 1-46 (1997) [hereinafter Saint-Gobain) (declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement). The Commission held on that
occasion:
(44) The parties, in the response to the Statement of Objections, argued that
in the anti-dumping investigation in 1994 the Commission reached the
conclusion that supply-side arguments are strong enough that a definition of the market in terms of end-use applications is not justified in the
case of SiC. According to the parties, the Commission would be acting
inconsistently with the Council anti-dumping Regulation of April 1994, if
it were to define the five above mentioned markets as the relevant product markets for the purpose of the current proceedings.
(45) In this respect, it should be noted that the purpose of an anti-dumping
proceeding and a merger proceeding is not the same. An anti-dumping
proceeding is intended to rectify distortions in international trade, so
that measures can be taken against dumping which is causing material
injury to producers in the Community, to the extent that the measures
offset the injury caused to those producers.
(46) In an anti-dumping procedure, measures may only be taken in so far as it
has been established that the product produced by the Community industry is a 'like product' to the imported product under consideration.
This definition of the like product in an anti-dumping proceeding can
therefore be of a different nature from the definition of the relevant
product market(s) for the purposes of the Merger Regulation.
(47) In an investigation under the Merger Regulation, a detailed assessment
of, among other things, the applications of a product in the Community,
customer groups or substitute products is given more attention. This
can, therefore, lead to a wider or narrower definition of the relevant
product market than would be the case under the assessment of the antidumping legislation.
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A legal interpretation of Article 2(6) of the Agreement by
the Contracting Parties, introducing the requirement of direct
competition between models considered for inclusion in a "like
product" definition, may be an effective way to increase legal certainty by limiting the discretion of administering authorities.
Moreover, such legal interpretation would enhance fair
competition by requiring that only dumped imported products
that are in direct competition with the domestic industry's products can be considered in the injury assessment (i.e., only imported products competing with domestic products can be
deemed to cause injury to the domestic industry).
The assessment of direct competition between two models
considered for inclusion in the "'like" product definition should
be precise enough not to leave wide margins of discretion to the
administering authorities. For example, it should include an examination of physical characteristics, end uses, and consumer
perceptions by using the "two way" interchangeability test (i.e.,
each of the models considered should be deemed to be substitutable by the other models in its peculiar technical applications/end uses/consumer perceptions). Moreover, a quantita(48) In the present case, it was considered that the notified operation required also an examination of the downstream markets of crystallized
SiC intended for abrasive, refractory, and other industrial applications,
whereas the Council Regulation adopting the anti-dumping measures
considered that, although different grades of SiC with different uses existed, the similar physical characteristics, the similar production process
and the existence of a certain degree of substitutability between metallurgical grade SiC and crude crystallized SiC constituted sufficient
grounds for deciding that SiC in general, sold by the Community producers, should be considered a like product to that imported from the
countries concerned. However, supply-side substitutability was only considered in the anti-dumping proceeding to the extent that it was recognized that crude crystallized SiC could be used as a substitute for metallurgical SiC. It follows that metallurgical SiC was not a substitute for
crystallized SiC intended for abrasive, refractory, and other industrial applications. (Noting that in the EC the Commission has exclusive competence on merger cases, while it is also responsible as regards the substantive determinations (including product scope) in anti-dumping proceedings. From the Commission Decision in the merger case, it appears that
a "two ways" substitutability test applied for anti-dumping purposes between the different kinds of SiC would result in a decision that they are
not the same "like" product, i.e. in a decision in line with the decision
reached by the Merger Task Force of the Commission in the merger
case).
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tive test of cross elasticity of demand of the models should be
performed.
Normally direct competition is more specifically referred to
the examination of the end uses of models considered for inclusion in a "like product" definition. However, it can be argued
that differences in physical characteristics between two models
also influence the degree of substitutability between them, and,
therefore, the direct competition test also takes into account differences in physical characteristics. Indeed, the concept of direct competition between models is not necessarily related to the
exclusive consideration of their end uses or consumer perceptions.
A direct competition test would strike the right balance between the relative weight of the various factors (physical characteristics, end uses, and consumer perceptions) to be considered
by the administering authorities while determining the product
scope of an anti-dumping investigation.
The need for such a balance is all the more urgent after the
interpretation given to the notion of "like" product in the context of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 23 ("ASCM") by the WTO Panel in Indonesia-CertainMeasures Affecting the Automobile Industry.24
23. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
The definitions of "like" product in the ADA and in the ASCM are identical.
24. Indonesia-CertainMeasures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia CarPanel]. The Panel gave special, although not exclusive, attention to physical
characteristics in examining different car models, stating that:
In our view, the analysis as to which cars have "characteristics closely resembling" those of the Timor logically must include as an important element the
physical characteristics of the cars in question. This is especially the case because many of the other possible criteria identified by the parties are closely
related to the physical characteristics of the cars in question. Thus, factors
such as brand loyalty, brand image/reputation, status and resale value reflect,
at least in part, an assessment by purchasers of the physical characteristics of
the cars being purchased. Although it is possible that products that are physically very different can be put to the same uses, differences in uses generally
arise out of, and assist in assessing the importance of, different physical characteristics of products. Similarly, the extent to which products are substitutable may also be determined in substantial part by their physical characteristics. Price differences also may (but will not necessarily) reflect physical differences in products. An analysis of tariff classification principles may be useful
because it provides guidance as to which physical distinctions between products were considered significant by Customs experts. However, we do not see
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The Panel correctly noted that its interpretation of the
"like" product provision contained in the ASCM 25 is confirmed
by the negotiating history of the provision.
Such interpretation emphasizes physical characteristics, but
is open to other criteria. In fact, in its, penultimate version, the
Agreement defined the term "like" product to mean a product
that "has physical characteristics close to those of the exported
product."2 6 In the revised draft of March 28, 1967, the word
"physical" was deleted from the text, which led to the formula27
tion "characteristics closely resembling" that exists today.
The like product analysis, as performed today by some administering authorities, is not necessarily related to the requirement of direct competition, and often focuses excessively on
physical characteristics. This has lead administering authorities
to expand like product definitions, on the basis of broadly resembling physical features, well beyond the commercial reality
of a market-based approach.2 8
A similar definition, coupled with a notion of injury as mere
"damage" to the domestic industry, which in itself, can be caused
also by a product not directly competing with the domestic industry's products, can be used arbitrarily to expand the level of
protection beyond the spirit of the Agreement. The discretion
of administering authorities can only be reduced by taking into
account, both in the like product determination and in the injury assessment, the principle of fair competition.
that the SCM Agreement precludes us from looking at criteria other than
physical characteristics, where relevant to the like product analysis. The term
"characteristics closely resembling" in its ordinary meaning includes but is not
limited to physical characteristics, and we see nothing in the context or object
and purpose of the ASCM Agreement that would dictate a different conclusion.
Id.
25. See id. at 365, fn. 730.
26. SeeKennedy RoundAnti-Dumping Code, T.64/NAB/W/16 (Mar. 3, 1967) (quoted
in the Indonesia Car Panel at page 365, fn. 730).
27. Id.
28. See Bronkers & McWelis, supra note 21. A like product definition not based on
direct competition within models, can include wider ranges of models, all having the
same general physical features (most models are not physically identical, therefore, the
administering authorities often recur to the second indent of Article 2.6 of the ADA),
disregarding price differences, end uses, and consumer perceptions. Hence the importance of the direct competition test to strike a balance between the various criteria, as
explained in the beginning of this Part.
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III. INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION AND
COMMERCIAL HARASSMENT
A. Current WTO Law and Practice
As far as the quality of evidence required for initiation of an
investigation is concerned, WTO panels do not interpret the
current Article 5 of the Agreement very strictly. It is established
WTO case law29 that the evidence required to initiate a case
need not be of the same quality as the evidence required for a
decision on imposition of duties." Article 5.3, however, requests
29. See Guatemala-Anti-dumpingInvestigation RegardingPortlandCement from Mexico,
Report of the Panel, WT/DS60/R (June 19, 1998) [hereinafter Guatemala Cement 1]; see,
e.g., Mexico-Anti-dumping Investigation on High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)from the United
States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS132/R Uan. 28, 2000) [hereinafter HFCS Case].
30. The Report of the Panel in Guatemala Cement I, reversed on other grounds,
examined whether the information on dumping included in the complaint against
Portland cement from Mexico met the requirements of Article 5.2 of the ADA. In particular, paragraphs 7.64 and 7.65 of Guatemala Cement I states that:
7.64 In our view, in assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation, an investigating authority may not ignore the
provisions of Article 2 of the ADP Agreement. Article 5.2 of the Agreement requires an application to include evidence of "dumping" and Article 5.3 requires a determination that there is "sufficient" evidence to
justify initiation. Article 2 of the ADP Agreement sets forth the technical elements of a calculation of dumping, including the requirements
for determining normal value, export price, and adjustments required
for a fair comparison. In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to
"dumping" must be read as a reference to dumping as it is defined in
Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that the evidence provided in
the application must be of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping. However, evidence of the relevant type is, in our view, required in a case
such as this one where it is obvious on the face of the application that
the normal value and export price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair comparison. At a minimum, there should be some recognition that a fair comparison will require such adjustments.
7.65 In our view, this provision establishes an obligation for investigating authorities to make a fair comparison. Investigating authorities can certainly expect that exporters will provide the information necessary to
make adjustments, and demonstrate that particular differences for
which adjustments are sought affect price comparability. However, the
authorities cannot, in our view, ignore the question of a fair comparison
in determining whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation, particularly when the need for adjustments is apparent on
the face of the application. Moreover, the exporting country or company may not even be aware that an application has been filed and the
initiation of an investigation is being considered, and is in any event
generally not a participant in the initiation decision, and can therefore
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a logically coherent analysis be made on the basis of the information provided in the petition, not on the information available to
the petitioners.3 1 Most importantly, the Guatemala Cement I
panel report stated that actions during the investigation cannot
cure a failure to observe the Article 5 initiation requirements for
then the entire investigation would rest on a WTO-inconsistent
basis.3 2 Notably, other GATT/WTO panels have concluded that
there is no basis from which to draw the conclusion that an infringement of initiation requirements can be cured retroactively.33
In sum, while WTO panels do not interpret Articles 5.2 and
5.3 of the Agreement in the narrowest way, important consequences follow from procedural infringements in the initiation
of an anti-dumping investigation.
The initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, or even rumors of possible initiation, often onerously impact an exporting
country's industry. Unrelated importers in the importing country may consider switching sources of supply to countries the investigation does not target. Significant costs importing countries
incur include replying to questionnaires, attending hearings,
and hiring lawyers or consultants. These costs often prove pronot provide this information prior to initiation. Thus, Guatemala's position would make it more likely that investigations will be initiated on
the basis of insufficient or incorrect evidence of dumping.
See Guatemala Cement I paras. 7.64, 7.65.
31. The obligations under Article 5.3 ADA have been interpreted by the WTO
Panel in Guatemala Cement I as follows:
If the investigating authority were to determine that the evidence and information in the application was not accurate, or that it was not adequate to
support a conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation of
an investigation, the investigating authority would be precluded from initiating an investigation. Thus, the decision to initiate is made by reference to the
objective sufficiency of the evidence in the application, and not by reference
to whether the evidence and information provided in the application is all
that is reasonably available to the applicant.
Guatemala Cement I, para. 7.50.
The Panel adopted the reasoning of the previous Softwood Lumber Panel BISD 40S/
358 with respect to the sufficiency of the information for the initiation, in the sense that
the sufficiency requirement is not fulfilled by a mere allegation or conjecture.
32. Guatemala Cement I, para. 8.6.
33. See United States-Antidumping duties on Gray PortlandCement and Cement Clinker
from Mexico, ADP/82, Report of the Panel (Sept. 7, 1992); United States-Imposition of
Antidumping Duties on Imports of Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow Productsfrom Sweden, ADP/
47, Report of the Panel (Aug. 20, 1990).
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hibitive for small and medium sized exporters, especially in developing countries.
These considerations lead to the identification of a set of
problems that concern the application of Article 5 in relation to
the implementation of the general principles set out earlier in
Part I.
B. Application of the GeneralPrinciples and Possible Reforms
First, the principle of restriction of anti-dumping should
lead us to consider that only anti-dumping petitions with serious
grounds should be considered worth for the purpose of initiating a complex and burdensome proceeding for both WTO
Members importing countries and industries of exporting Members, with consequent inevitable distortions in the trade flows.
Second, the principle of enhancing fair competition suggests that the domestic industry's use of anti-dumping petitions
to commercially harass exporters should be prohibited, or at
least limited. Third, the legal certainty principle requests that
the standards of review for the information provided in the petition should not allow the administering authorities to make excessively permissive interpretations.
Finally, special consideration should be given to developing
countries. The burden of an unsubstantiated initiation is much
higher for the exporting industries of developing countries, and
therefore, special considerations should be taken to limit this
burden. Developing countries should be afforded the opportunity to remedy a situation of dumping before a proceeding is
initiated.
Possible reforms of the Agreement might include an antiharassment provision, pre-consultations provisions, and some
provisions designed for developing countries.
1. Anti-harassment Provision
A way to deal with the current problems with Article 5 ADA
would be introducing a provision, as already proposed at Seattle,
aiming at preventing the administering authorities from accepting a petition if an investigation covering the same product
and the same countries has been terminated within the previous
365 days of the filing of the petition. The provision would prevent that countries and exporters that have .been recently tried
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undergo the burden of a new investigation immediately after the
termination of the previous one, as for instance in the EC antidumping cases concerning unbleached cotton fabrics.
2. Pre-Consultations
Another reform would introduce new rules providing for a
system of pre-consultations, designed pursuant to Article 13.1 of
the ASCM. Under the new rules, an administering authority receiving a petition would be obligated to invite the Member concerned to hold meaningful consultations to discuss the factual
situation and the sufficiency (or seriousness, see Section III.B.3
infra) of the evidence provided in the petition, and arrive at a
mutually agreed solution. If some of the exporting countries are
WITO developing country Members, an additional period of implementation would be provided, upon request of the developing Member concerned. This period would allow the industry of
such countries to remedy, if needed, the situation of alleged
dumping (e.g., sales at competitive prices to earn foreign currency in periods of acute financial crisis), and would permit the
exporting Member to deal with the temporary situations of economic or monetary crisis that may have caused international
trade distortions.
The implementation period could rage from three to six
months. If the importing Member decides to initiate the investigation, the implementation period would be included in the period of investigation.
These amendments would shelter exporting Members (in
particular developing countries), from initiation of an investigation when an agreement can be reached (or at least after substantial efforts to reach such agreement have been made); these
amendments would avoid initiation before exporting Members
have had the possibility to consult with the importing Members
on the facts of the matter; finally these amendments would, in
the case of developing countries, avoid initiation when the situation can be remedied in a reasonable period of time (e.g.,
dumping due to currency fluctuations, temporary financial crises, temporary sales below cost in cyclical industries, etc.). Although the role of the exporting Member in anti-dumping proceedings may be more limited when compared to anti-subsidy
proceedings, the possibility of the exporting Member concerned
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to actively participating in the proceeding from an early stage
should not be underscored, as often investigated Members can
provide the administering authorities of importing Members
with relevant information (e.g., on level of trade on the domestic
market, exchange rate fluctuations and monetary policy, nonmarket economy treatment, cyclical industries, captive production, etc.) that can have important consequences on the level of
duty or on the decision to initiate the proceeding.
3. Special and Differential Treatment for
Developing Countries
In case of petitions filed with authorities of developed country
Members concerning imports of products from developing country Members, if a developing country shows, in the course of the
pre-consultations, that the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation would affect one of its essential interests, 4 the investigation should be initiated, in any case after the implementation
period, only if the petition contains serious evidence of injury
(stricter requirement than the sufficient evidence currently provided for in Article 5 ADA), and only if the protection of the
domestic industry of the importing developed country Member
from imports from all developing country Members targeted in
the petition, considered in isolation from imports originating in
all developed Members involved, represents an essential interest
for the importing developed country Member. 35 These provisions would substantially elevate the initiation requirements for
investigations of developed countries concerning imports from
developing countries, when essential interests of developing
countries are at stake, and would also make sure that, when such
essential interests of developing countries are involved, there
must be an essential interest of the importing developed country
to protect its domestic industry.
IV. THE DETERMINATION OF DUMPING
A distinction between sales below cost and price discriminat34. The essential interest of the developing country Member should be defined in
quantitative terms, so to avoid any discretion on the part of the investigating authority
of the importing country, e.g., a percentage figure of total value of exports of the developing country.
35. Also in this case the "essential interest" of the developed country should be
defined in quantitative terms to avoid discretion.
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ing dumping (selling domestically at a higher price than in the
export market) can be inferred from the structure of Article 2 of
the Agreement. There is no practical differentiation in the
Agreement, however, between selling below cost and mere price
discrimination, except from the calculation of the dumping margin.
It is unlikely that WTO Members, traditional users of antidumping measures, will agree in the near future to a substantial
reform in the scope of Article 2 (e.g., targeting sales below cost
only or introducing additional requirements to enhance the
principle of fair competition in the definition of dumping). The
increasing use of anti-dumping measures by non-traditional
users, however, will inevitably lead to an increase of WTO antidumping litigation, and maybe to changes in traditional user's
practices regarding Article 2.
For example, a recent panel report in European Communities-Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from
India 6 ("Bed Linen") has condemned the zeroing technique, a
methodology used by the EC (and by other WTO Members) in
aggregating the data of model-based comparisons between normal value and export price for the purpose of calculating the
total dumping margin for the product concerned.
Article 2 does currently provide for detailed rules on the
36. European Communities-Anti-DumpingDuties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
from India, Report of the Panel, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000).
37. Zeroing is a technique adopted by the EC when calculating the weighted average dumping margin for the product concerned on the basis of the results obtained in
the weighted average-to-weighted average comparisons of normal value and export
price for each model included in the product scope of the investigation. In order to
calculate the total dumping margin, the EC multiplies, for each model, the volume of
imports by the amount of the weighted average price difference between normal value
and export price (the weighted average dumping amount for each model). In doing
this, the EC counts as zero the dumping amounts of those models for which the
weighted average difference between normal value and export price is negative (i.e., for
which there is a negative weighted average dumping amount as normal value is, on
average, lower than export price). The EC then divides the total dumping amount
calculated in this fashion, by the (CIF) value of the exports involved, including the
value of those models for which the individual margin and the dumping amount is
negative, and was thus counted as zero. Zeroing is traditionally justified by arguing that
it is used to counteract selective dumping, i.e., price manipulations to offset positive/
negative dumping margins between different models. However, if the definition of the
product was actually market-based, in the sense described in Part I above, then offsetting of dumping margins of different models could not be considered as a methodology
to hide dumping, as all models would still belong to the same "like" product, and therefore would be in direct competition within each other.
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calculation of normal value and on the comparison between normal value and export price. However, in many respects, Article 2
is still vague and does not effectively limit discretion of administering authorities, as shown by the rules that affect price comparability.38
Unfortunately, the degree of economic analysis in the calculation of the dumping margin is limited. For instance, the use of
constructed normal value is based on formalistic rules that are
not always justified in light of the rationale of competitionfriendly trade defense measures, and do not take into account
particular economic situations (e.g., cyclical industries).
From the exporters' perspective, four kinds of situations are
particularly penalizing in the calculation of the dumping margin
and leave much discretion to administering authorities.
First, the situation in which the exporter does not sell sufficient quantities domestically to permit a comparison between
normal value and export price. In such cases normal value can
be, and in many occasions actually is, "constructed" by the administering authority. However, in such cases, it would appear
more reasonable, because the company in question's normal
prices are export prices, to calculate normal value on the basis of
the price to the largest export market.3 9 This would prevent the
administering authority to use discretion in constructing a domestic price on a market in which the company does not normally sell.
Second, a situation in which the amount of domestic sales
(or sales to a third country) are below cost and considered too
large to permit comparison between domestic (or a third country's) and export price. In this case, as in the previous one,' the
justification of dumping on the basis of the economic theories of
market segregation/sanctuary market does not apply. 40 In fact,
the exporting company in these cases does not earn a monopo38. A good example is the lack of detailed rules dealing with foreign exchange rate
fluctuations in ADA Article 2.4.
39. SeeJ. Miranda et al., The InternationalUse of Antidumping-1 987-1997, 32 J. OF
WORLD TRADE 5, 62 (1998).
40. Market segregation means that trade between the domestic market of the exporter and the export market is significantly impeded because the exporter has a dominant position in his domestic market and uses it to block imports, or because of administrative/legal constraints. The expression sanctuary market is used to define a situation whereby the exporter can overprice on its protected domestic market and crosssubsidize exports with the monopolistic surplus earned domestically.
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listic surplus on its domestic market, and therefore cannot crosssubsidize its exports to the export market concerned. There is a
variety of good economic reasons leading a company to price
below cost on the domestic market, and long term distortions
caused by this type of behavior can be dealt with in the framework of other trade defense measures (e.g., anti-subsidies, in
case of export subsidies that make sale below cost viable for the
exporting industry). In any case, such economic reasons should
be taken into account in order to limit the use of constructed
normal value to the situations where there is no reasonable
doubt that the protracted sales below cost are causing poor financial performance, and are an indicator of "defensive" dumping, not monopolistic, intent.
A third situation regards exporters operating in "non-market" economy countries, in relation to which many administering authorities often use constructed normal values, after a superficial investigation of their particular situation. Also in this
case, the degree of analysis to establish "why" the company
dumped (is it subsidized by its government?) is limited, and the
methods of constructing normal value with reference to data collected from other markets often result in punitive dumping margins."
Finally, very high standards of burden of proof for duty
drawback allowances applied by certain administrative authorities render Article 2.4 of little use to exporters wanting to benefit
from duty drawback allowances: An amendment to Article 2.4 of
the Agreement could be envisaged specifying that duty drawback
adjustments should be. granted by the administering authorities
if the exporter proves that he. has satisfied local, administrative
requirements to be granted the duty drawback and/or the ex41. It is recalled that Interpretative Note.2 Paragraph 1 of Article VI, (contained in
Annex I to the GATT) is drafted in a language that is actually quite restrictive of the use
of special provisions for non market economies. The Note refers indeed to countries
that have "a complete or substantially complete monopoly" of their trade and where all
domestic prices are fixed by the State. However, various administrative authorities apply
these criteria with flexibility. It would indeed be desirable to extend automatic and
unconditional market economy status to all WTO Members, also in consideration of the
level of global trade liberalization achieved after six years of implementation of the
Uruguay Round, and of the very high standards of trade liberalization requested to
AITO accessing countries. Alternatively, a provision could be introduced in Article 2
ADA, imposing on the administering authorities the burden of proof of the non market
economy status of the exporter in the course of the investigation, by means of quantitative tests.

50

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:30

porting Members certifies the amount of duty drawback granted
for the product concerned.
A. Reasonable Profit Margin in the Determination of Constructed
Normal Value ("CNV")
Article 2 of the Agreement is interpreted by administering
authorities to mean that if a product, or a model of the product
concerned (i) is not sold domestically, (ii) has domestic sales not
in the ordinary course of trade, or (iii) has domestic sales of very
low quantities (i.e., not "representative," a normal value can be
constructed), a reasonable profit margin should be used in calculating the CNV.
The Agreement provides certain guidance as to the methodology to pursue for constructing normal value, including the
level of profit to be taken into account. Article 2.2 of the Agreement establishes that the constructed normal value shall be
based on cost of production plus a "reasonable" amount for selling and general costs and for profit. Article 2.2.2 of the Agreement further clarifies that such amounts "shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary
course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer
under investigation." Therefore, a "reasonable" profit amount
should be based on actual data pertaining to production and
sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product.
However, the Agreement does not set out a methodology
for establishing a profit margin (i.e., it remains silent as to how
to express such amounts as a margin, for example, as a percentage on turnover or on cost of production).42
42. In the EC, in order to calculate a reasonable profit margin, the Commission
first establishes the profit amount. This amount is the sum of all profit amounts pertaining to individual domestic sales, in the ordinary course of trade, of the like product.
The Commission subsequently calculates a reasonable profit margin by expressing the
above profit amount as a percentage of the turnover of sales that passed the ordinary
course of trade test only. This results in most cases in an unreasonably high profit
margin, which usually substantially exceeds the company-wide profit margin on turnover. The Commission's methodology consists, therefore, in taking the profit margin of

the transactions in the ordinary course of trade. It is our view that the methodology
pursued by the Commission to express profit amounts of transactions in the ordinary
course of trade as a percentage of the turnover of these transactions only, results in
unreasonably and artificially high profit margins. In doing so, the Commission manifestly disregards the reality of commercial operations in the sector concerned. Producers would never be able to sell in their domestic markets all product types with the high
profit margin of the transactions in the ordinary course of trade. Commercial reality is
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The Agreement requests investigating authorities to determine the profit amounts pertaining to sales in the ordinary
course of trade and not of all sales. This means that negative
profit amounts (i.e., losses) must in principle be disregarded in
order not to compensate for profits. Such profit amounts could
be expressed as a percentage of total turnover or of total cost of
production. In other words, the profit margin could be based
on the calculation of the profit amount as required by the current Article 2.2.2 of the Agreement but expressed as a percentage of the producer's total domestic turnover or cost of production. An amendment in this direction will greatly enhance the
fairness and reasonability of the calculation of the profit margin
for the CNV purposes.
The Agreement expressly requires that profit amounts be
"reasonable" in the last sentence of Article 2.2. It is our view that
this "reasonability" should also apply to the calculation of the
profit margin, and that a reasonable approach is taking the net
profit amounts (i.e., after zeroing amounts pertaining to losses)
and expressing them as a percentage of total domestic turnover
or cost of production. There is nothing in the current version of
the Agreement preventing authorities to calculate the profit
margin in this manner, however further specifying this procedure in Article 2 would greatly reduce discretion in the calculation of CNV.
The question is fundamentally whether it is "reasonable" to
express the profit amount as a percentage of the turnover of the
sales in the ordinary course of trade only. It is our view that such
methodology is extremely unfair because it leads to an over-inflated profit margin that producers could never reach in domestic sales of other individual product types. Therefore, it is not an
appropriate surrogate for profit margin, as it is unreasonably
high.

that all companies offset profitable with non-profitable sales in order to reach a company-wide profit margin that would be satisfactory for the company's shareholders. Notably, in the case of producers who manufacture and sell a large number of product
types, commercial reality is that certain of those types may be sold at a loss, to be compensated by other product types that are sold at a high profit. The profit margin of the
high-profit product types and transactions only is not necessarily an appropriate and
"reasonable" surrogate for other product types.
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B. Conclusion
While a dumping definition based exclusively on sales below
costs does not appear to be acceptable to many WTO Members,
a limited objective or reform, aiming at a more fair treatment of
exporters from all countries, could be to raise the requirements
for the use of constructed normal value and its calculation,
which currently lead to discriminatory high dumping margins.
V. INJURY
Recent panel reports have given quite a restrictive interpretation of the requirements set forth in Article 3 of the Agreement (in particular paragraph 1 read in conjunction with para4
graph 4).
However, while WTO case law has essentially put administrative authorities under the obligation of strictly abiding by some
procedural requirements (limiting their discretion), obligations
regarding the depth of analysis of the factual situation for an
injury finding are still complied with using a formalistic approach, rather than a thorough economic analysis.
A thorough economic analysis, also in quantitative terms, is
indeed essential to introduce elements of reform inspired to the
principles of enhancing fair competition and providing special
and differential treatment for developing countries.
It must be stressed, however, that the enhancement of the
principle of fair competition in Article 3 without substantially reforming the dumping definition of Article 2 and the "like" product analysis, would dramatically limit the meaning of such a reform.
It has been suggested, from various sides, that making the
"lesser duty" principle, contained in Article 9.1 in the form of
"recommendation," a mandatory requirement, would greatly enhance fairness in application of anti-dumping duties. It would
be indeed advisable to limit protection granted against dumped
imports to the extent such imports actually cause injury to the
43. See, e.g.,
Mexico-Anti-dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
from the United States, Panel Report, WT/DS132/R Uan. 28, 2000); European Communities-Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cottage-type Bed Linen from India, Panel Report,
WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000); Thailand-Anti-dumpingduties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-alloy Steel and H-beamsfrom Poland, Panel Report, WT/DS122/R (Sept.

28, 2000).
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domestic industry. Looking at it from a developing country
Member's perspective, however, the obligation to calculate an
injury margin, in addition to the dumping margin, could perhaps add an excessive burden on the administering authorities
of developing countries which are often understaffed, lacking
the many years of practice experience of the traditional users,
and overloaded with work. This proposed reform should therefore be evaluated in light of a cost/benefit analysis between a
more balanced and competition-friendly approach to the imposition of duties and the excessive procedural burden on administering authorities of developing countries.
The introduction, however, of the lesser duty rule should be
accompanied by further specification of the rules to calculate
the injury margin, for example by rules to "quantify" the provision contained in Article 3.5 of the Agreement, establishing that
the injuries caused by known factors other than the dumped imports shall not be attributed to the dumped imports.
For instance, the practice used by the EC to calculate an
injury margin and injury removal price taking into account eventual price depression and suppression of price increases on the
EC market, does not normally take into account elements suppressing or depressing prices which cannot be attributed to the
dumped imports.44
If requiring authorities to conduct a quantitative injury analysis is not a reform that the majority of the WTO Members could
agree at this stage, a less ambitious approach would probably
aim at the reform of Article 3.5 with a view to enhancing the
procedural requirements in the analysis of the causal link.
A good start would be to require that all the "other factors"
listed in Article 3.5 of the Agreement be analyzed by the administering authority, on the model of the analysis requested by
Article 3.4 for the evaluation of the impact of dumped imports
on the domestic industry.
It also would be useful to specify that the causal link should
be assessed exclusively with reference to the imports actually
44. The EC normally calculates the injury removal price by allocating to the EC
industry a target profit (the profit the industry should be making in absence of dumping) and adding it to the cost of production and SG&A of the Community industry.
Unfortunately, in calculating the injury removal price, the Commission rarely takes into
account factors other than the dumped imports, influencing the performance of the
Community industry.
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dumped, and not with reference to all imports from all. countries
concerned in the investigation (i.e., if the investigation shows
that part of the imports from a country, or part of the sales of an
investigated company were not dumped, then those imports/
transactions should not be included in the injury assessment).
Quantification of the "other factors," as explained above in
the context of the calculation of the injury margin, would ensure
that the administering authorities, although not subject to the
burden of calculating an injury margin, would have nevertheless
to make sure that the occurrence of injury is assessed disregarding the exact impact of the "other factors."
Those three amendments to Article 3.5 would ensure that
the administering'authorities perform an analysis of the causal
link to a degree of depth far beyond current practice in most
jurisdictions.
A. A Coherent Approach
Until the time when the principle of fair competition is implemented in the determination of the injury to the domestic
industry (i.e., the injury determination becomes an unfair injury
determination), there will always be the risk that anti-dumping
legislation provides' protection to situations of self-inflicted injury (mis-management, inefficiency of the domestic industry) or
anticompetitive behavior's of the domestic industry (e.g., abuses
of dominant position and concerted practices with the aim of
artificially increasing prices on the domestic market). In brief,
the injury determination should not be inconsistent with the
need of international market arbitration and enhancing fair
competition on the domestic market of the importing country.
In many jurisdictions, problems regarding the impact of
competition policy on trade policy are exacerbated by the failure
of the responsible administrations (often separate agencies) to
coordinate on trade and competition policy. An old excuse to
justify such a failure is the'fact that anti-dumping cases must take
place within a limited period of time while competition investigations can last for years.
In our opinion this is not sufficient reason to prevent coordination between trade and competition authorities. A system
could be established enabling proper account to be taken of
competition concerns raised in an anti-dumping case. The rele-
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vant competition authority of the importing Member should be
allowed to play an active role in anti-dumping investigations
where allegations of anticompetitive behaviors or consequences
are submitted by interested parties to the administering authority of the importing Member, at the latest, following provisional
disclosure.
Such competition authority should then pronounce within
a two-month-period whether or not it is satisfied that prima facie
the competition allegations are well founded. In cases where
there is prima facie evidence to suggest the existence of anticompetitive behavior or effects having a bearing on the injury
analysis, then the imposition of definitive anti-dumping duties
would be temporarily suspended and imports made subject to
registration. Anti-dumping duties would only be imposed upon
the competition authority rejecting allegations about the existence of an anticompetitive conduct, or alternatively, in case of a
finding of an anticompetitive behavior not having a bearing on
the injury analysis (not capable of breaking the causal link between dumping and injury). Competition principles would thus
be taken right to the heart of the injury assessment. This would
guarantee that anti-dumping procedures are used for their original purpose, namely to protect domestic industries from harmful unfair foreign-based competition. The new rules would act
as a strong deterrent to domestic industries contemplating
bringing anti-dumping action to safeguard anti-competitive
rents.
More generally, interpreting the Agreement in accordance
with anti-trust principles would encourage more accurate and economically sound analyses to be carried out. This approach
would assist in an elaboration of standards of consistency so that
the requirement of unfair trade that justifies anti-dumping remedies would be exclusively satisfied according to competition criteria.4 5
VI. REVIEWS
The lack of procedural requirements in Article 11 of the
Agreement has often caused problems of legal certainty to companies from both developed and developing countries. From
45. See Maria-Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practicesin InternationalTrade and
the Role of the World Trade Organization, 32J. OF WORLD TRADE 117, 151 (1998).
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the outset, a much-needed amendment is one that sets time limits upon administering authorities in which to make a formal decision of whether or not to accept a request of review.4 6
Companies subject to interim and sunset reviews often see
the reviews protracted well beyond the twelve months "recommended" by Article 11.4 of the Agreement, 47 with well imaginable consequences, not only in terms of legal certainty. More importantly, in fact, the measures may stay in place: unchanged
pending the outcome of the review.
Setting a twelve-month mandatory term, coupled with automatic suspension of duties pending the outcome of reviews (or
with retroactive termination of duties in case of a sunset review
with negative outcome), would greatly facilitate the rationale
and user-friendliness of reviews.
Finally, the proposal to reduce the five-year standard term
for definitive duties, would facilitate a complete factual re-assessment after a reasonable period of time (three or four years).
However, this reform would certainly make the burden for administering authorities of developing countries heavier, and
should therefore be dropped.
VII. RULES ON ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION
The current Agreement does not provide for rules on anticircumvention. In fact, the relevant provisions on anti-circumvention and country hopping were deleted from the final version of the Agreement when it became. apparent that a compromise could not be reached on the amendments proposed by the
United States on the Dunkel text. As a result of the Uruguay
Round, negotiating efforts were put in the Ministerial Declaration on Circumvention, which has been considered sufficient by
some Members to enable them to enact and actually use anticircumvention measures. It would be advisable to set out rules
to limit the discretion of administering authorities in applying
anti-circumvention measures.
46. Delays in the initiation of interim reviews are often experienced by applicants
in the EC.
47. A recent example is the EC anti-dumping investigation concerning Pocket
lighters from Japan, a case in which the sunset review lasted 38 months. See Council
Regulation No. 174/2000, OJ. L 22/16 (2000) (repealing Council Regulation No.
3433/91 O.J. L 22/i6 (2000) insofar as it imposes a definitive anti-dumping duty on
imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable -pocket flint lighters originating in Japan).
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If. circumvention is defined as a change in the pattern of
trade of the "like" product concerned in the original anti-dumping investigation between one of the exporting countries involved in the original anti-dumping investigation, and the importing Member concerned, or between third countries and the
importing country, which stems from a practice,,process or work
for which there is no due cause or economic justification other
than the attempt to avoid anti-dumping duties, we can identify
the following requirements for the extension of anti-dumping
duties:
(1) The party under investigation, or an enterprise related
,thereto; is subject to the circumvented anti-dumping
duty at the time of the anti-circumvention investigation,
(2) The product being investigated is a "like product,"
within the meaning of Article 2.6 of the Agreement,
(3) The alleged 'circumventing practice causes changes in
the patterns of trade between the countries under consideration,
(4) The alleged circumventing practice started, or substantially increased, immediately after the parties concerned had legal knowledge of the initiation of the
original anti-dumping investigation (i.e., within a maximum of six months from the notification of the petition
to the party concerned),
(5) The alleged circumventing practice is shown not to
have a due cause or economic justification other than
the attempt to circumvent the anti-dumping duty. If
the practice also could be undertaken for reasons different from the attempt to avoid imposition of the duty,
then the unequivocal link requirement should not be
deemed fulfilled. The burden should be on the administering authority to prove the existence of an unequivocal link, and
(6) There is positive evidence that the remedial effects of
the anti-dumping duty are being undermined by the
circumventing practice in terms of the prices and quantities of the like product being sold in the importing
country. In particular it should be found that there is
dumping in relation to the normal value previously established for the like product in the original anti-dump-
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ing investigation, and that the domestic industry of the
importing country is being injured as a result of the circumventing operation.
It would be very important, in order to limit the discretion
of the investigating authorities, that the requirements listed
above are precisely defined. For example, definition of the term
"related party," or the requirements for establishing the causal
link should be described in detail.
VIII. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Special rules should be provided concerning developing
countries with respect to the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation, as noted earlier in Part I.
Moreover, market access of developing countries' products
on developed countries' markets should not be discouraged.
Therefore, a limited market penetration in a developed country
market, even at dumped prices, should not be sanctioned by
anti-dumping measures.
When the importing country concerned is a developed
country Member, the de minimis threshold for the dumping margin, currently 2% ad valorem for products from developed and
developing countries, may be increased to 4% for products
originating in developing countries.48
Import share thresholds are currently set at 3% of total volume of imports for each exporting country, unless all countries
under the 3% threshold collectively account for more then 7%
of all imports, in which case they would not benefit from the de
minimis import share. In light of the considerations set out
above, its seems appropriate to differentiate this discipline with
regard to developing countries as follows: the de minimis import
share would remain 3% for all exporting countries, but the 7%
collective threshold would only apply to developed countries
(i.e., only imports from developed countries could be cumulated, while developing countries would always enjoy a limited
market access of 3% free from the threat of anti-dumping action/measures). This would spare exporters in developing
countries from the costs of anti-dumping proceedings in case of
limited import shares from the outset, with no risk of cumula48. I.e., the 2% threshold would continue to apply to investigations carried out by
developing countries.

2000]

REFORM OF THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT

59

tion. Alternatively, the 7% threshold could be applied to developing countries' products, between developing countries only,
i.e., there would be two 7% thresholds: (a) one for developed
countries, which would allow cumulation of imports from a developed country in case imports from all countries below the 3%
threshold collectively account for more than 7% of total imports
and (b) one for developing countries, which would allow cumulation of imports from developing countries only if all imports
from developing countries below the 3% threshold collectively
account for more than 7% of total imports.4 9 The special and
differential treatment for developing countries could also include higher de minimis import share for such countries.
Finally, the provision of Article 15 of the Agreement concerning the application of anti-dumping duties to developing
country Members could be further specified. The most diligent
administrative authorities normally interpret Article 15 as an obligation of the exporters of developing countries to explore possibilities of price undertakings or at least communicate to developing country exporters availability to consider undertakings.
Unfortunately, often not even the interpretation described
above is followed, as for example in the EC proceeding concerning Bed Linen from India. In relation to that proceeding, the EC
has been held in violation of Article 15 by a WTO panel, for
failing to explore possibilities of constructive remedies in the
form of price undertakings.5 °
Article 15 of the Agreement is drafted in an extremely
vague and laconic fashion.5 1 One way to specify the obligations
under Article 15, in addition to providing more specific language concerning price undertakings, could be to introduce a
specific obligation exclusively upon administering authorities of
developed countries. This obligation would require the relevant
49. I.e., imports under 3% originating in developed countries would not be considered in the calculation. In other words, developing countries could only be cumulated between themselves, while developed countries would continue to be cumulated
according to the current provisions.
50. See Bed Linen, at 65-69.
51. Article 15 of the ADA states as follows: "It is recognized that special regard
must be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing
country Members when considering the application of anti-dumping measures under
this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement
shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members."
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administering authorities to initiate ex oficio an interim review of
the duties imposed on the developing countries after one year
from the imposition of the final duties, in the course of which
particular emphasis would be placed on reexamining the de
minimis dumping margins and import shares. Import statistics
and prices below the de minimis thresholds would thus constitute
sufficient ground for repealing duties.5 2 Such a provision would
ensure that imports from developing countries are frequently
monitored to guarantee the possibility of minimum market access, below the de minimis import shares and dumping margin.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The considerations regarding possible reforms to the current Anti-dumping Agreement were presented in a prescriptive
way, to demonstrate the existing gap between the principles set
out in Part I above and the current provisions of the Agreement.
The proposed reforms are examples of how the current provisions could be brought to conform to the principles that should
characterize the Agreement.
In our opinion, the discrepancy between the principles described above and the current text of the Agreement is the principle cause of many of the current WTO disputes in the area of
anti-dumping. Disputes arise when Members challenge decisions taken by administering authorities. These challenges allege that the authorities abuse their discretion or apply the relevant national provisions in a discriminatory manner by unduly
extending the protection granted by anti-dumping legislation,
overprotecting their domestic industries vis-d-vis competition
from foreign exporters, violating procedural rules established to
ensure the legality of the proceedings, or unfairly neglecting the
developing country status of the Members under investigation.
These principles could indeed inspire even deeper reforms.
Changes in the standard of review of Article 17 of the Agreement, imposing upon WTO panels the obligation to interpret
the Agreement in a way restrictive of the use of anti-dumping, 3
52. Unfortunately, the EC is opposed to this amendment as it concerns the dumping margin, on the ground that in reviews a de minimis dumping margin/import share is
not, per se, a sufficient reason for repealing the duties since the dumping margin could
have gone down as a result of the imposition of the duties/price undertakings.
53. Alternatively, and at a minimum, Article 17 of the ADA could be modified so
that the general standard of review laid down in the DSU applies to anti-dumping-
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or a change in the definition of injury as to introduce the principle of enhancing fair competition, as explained earlier, could be
made.
While the principle of restricting the use of anti-dumping
may be subject to differing opinions and negotiating positions
among WTO Members, all Contracting Parties of the GATT and
WTO agree that the world trading system should aim at enhancing fair competition, be based on clear and certain rules, and
promote development and economic reform. Differing views
may exist on the means to implement such objectives, but a majority of WTO Members' positions with respect to the Antidumping Agreement underscores the fact that the current provisions of the Agreement do not provide the adequate means to
satisfactorily achieve these goals.

related disputes. The negotiation of Article 17, however, was one of the most difficult
in the framework of the Agreement, and we doubt that the United States or the EC
would be willing to re-open it, especially in light of the outcome of recent anti-dumping-related disputes at the WTO.

